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Case Note: Case of Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania in the European Court of Human Rights
Stoyan Panov
University of Freiburg
Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany
Introduction and Facts of the Case 
Lithuania was incorporated in the USSR under the name “the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic” 
in 1944. In 1949, an all-partisan organization fighting for the independence of Lithuania was 
formed. From mid-September 1951, Mr. Vasiliauskas had been working as an operation agent of 
the MGB, the precursor of the KGB, on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR. On January 2, 1953, Mr. 
Vasiliauskas took part in an operation against two Lithuanian partisans of the Movement of the 
Struggle for the Freedom of Lithuania, the brothers J.A. and A.A, who were shot and killed in the 
Šakiai area in Lithuania. After the January 2, 1953 operation, Mr. Vasiliauskas was promoted to a 
senior operational agent and was awarded and decorated at least 24 times in his 25-year service in 
the KGB. 
In 2001, Vasiliauskas, along with another co-defendant, were charged with the crime of genocide 
perpetrated against the pair of Lithuanian partisans as representatives of a political group under 
Article 71(2) of the Lithuanian Criminal Code.1 In 2004, the Trial Court in Lithuania convicted 
Vasiliauskas for the crime of genocide against political, national and ethnic groups under the newly 
amended Article 99 of the Criminal Code of 1998; and he was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment, 
suspended on health grounds. On September 21, 2004, the Court of Appeal upheld his conviction 
and, on February 22, 2005, the Supreme Court of Lithuania followed suit. The Supreme Court 
found that “the 1998 amendments to the Criminal Code established the elements of the crime of 
genocide, and included in them acts aimed at physical extermination of some or all of the members 
of a social or political group. This characteristic of the crime of genocide remained in Article 99 of 
the Criminal Code.”2 
The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was seized of the issue 
of whether under Article 7(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) there was a 
sufficiently clear legal basis in the applicable law in 1953 for Vasiliauskas’ conviction in Lithuania. 
In particular, the ECtHR was tasked to examine whether the domestic conviction for genocide 
matched the offence and could have been foreseen by Vasiliauskas at the time of his participation in 
the operation of January 2, 1953, which resulted in the deaths of J.A. and A.A. The ECtHR decided 
in favor of Vasiliauskas by nine to eight votes that there was a violation of Article 7 of the ECHR. 
Procedure and Claims of the Parties  
Article 7(1) of the ECHR contains the nullum crimen sine lege principle, namely that “no one shall 
be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a 
criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed.” 
Mr. Vasiliauskas’ main argument was that the wide interpretation of the crime of genocide 
applied by the various court instances in Lithuania had no basis in public international law, 
in particular his conviction under Article 99 of the Lithuanian Criminal Code. Article 99 of the 
Lithuanian Criminal Code of 21 April 1998 defines the crime of genocide as “a person who, seeking 
to physically destroy some or all of the members of any national, ethnic, racial, religious, social or 
political group, organizes, is in charge of or participates in killing…them…shall be punished by 
imprisonment for a term of from five to twenty years or by life imprisonment.” (emphasis added)
The applicant, Mr. Vasiliauskas, claimed that prosecution for the killing of persons belonging to 
a political or social group was wider than what the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) allowed for. The applicant also contended that 
the genocide clause amended in 1998 was retroactively applied.3 Finally, he asserted that Article 
1 Case of Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber Judgment, October 20, 2015, 
Application no. 35343/05, paras. 29 and 52. 
2 Ibid., para. 35. 
3 Ibid., para. 123.
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7(2) of the ECHR is not applicable, as his conviction could not be qualified as genocide and, hence, 
it could not be qualified as “criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations.” 
The State representatives emphasized the specific nature of the resistance in Lithuania by 
organized military groups of partisans in the 1950s against the Soviet regime. The State asserted 
that by 1953 more than 500 000 Lithuanians had been affected by the terror politics of the Soviet 
regime by mass killings, deportations or imprisonments.4 The aim of the Soviet regime was “to 
destroy the former Lithuanian way of life and to replace it by a new Soviet order comprised of 
persons without nationality or ethnicity (homo sovieticus).”5 The murders of J.A. and A.A. could not 
only be regarded as murders of two members of a political group, but also as killings of persons 
belonging to two protected groups under the Genocide Convention, namely a national and an 
ethnic group, as the Soviet regime sought “to annihilate the culture, religion, language, politics 
and identity of the Lithuanian nation,” according to the State.6 The State claimed that the acts 
of the applicant constituted the criminal offence of genocide under conventional and customary 
international law in 1953 and it invoked as evidence UN Resolution 96 (I) of 1946 and the 1948 
Genocide Convention to which the USSR was a party in 1953. 
The Issue 
Mr. Vasiliauskas’ conviction was based on legal provisions that were not in force in 1953 as Lithuania 
was not an independent state at that time. Therefore, according to the applicant, such domestic 
provisions were applied retroactively, and the ECtHR had to decide whether there was a violation 
of Article 7 of the ECHR, unless the Court could find that the applicant’s conviction was based upon 
international law as it stood at the relevant time of the commission of the alleged acts of genocide. 
The Court’s Assessment 
The ECtHR began the analysis of Article 7 of the ECHR by ascertaining that a criminal offence 
must be defined in law, which prescribes a penalty, and that the principle must not be extensively 
construed to the accused’s detriment. The offence must be clearly defined in national and/or 
international law “where the individual can know from the wording of the relevant provision…
what acts and omissions will make him criminally liable.”7 The principle comprises of two 
elements—accessibility and foreseeability. The Court defined its task in the particular case as 
examining “whether there was a contemporaneous legal basis for the applicant’s conviction and, 
in particular, [whether] the result reached by the Lithuanian courts was compatible with Article 7” 
of the ECHR.8
Accessibility 
The ECtHR ruled that the domestic convictions of Mr. Vasiliauskas were based on retroactive 
applicability of Article 99 of the Criminal Code as the legal provision was not in force in 1953. 
Hence, this would constitute a violation under Article 7 of the ECHR, unless the international law 
at the time of the commission of the act in 1953 allowed for such conviction.9 The ECtHR examined 
the relevant international agreements to which the USSR was a party in 1953. The USSR signed the 
Genocide Convention on December 16, 1949 and the Convention came into force on January 12, 
1951. Therefore, the Court did not have trouble in finding that the crime of genocide was clearly 
recognized as an international crime in 1953, and the prohibition of genocide was “sufficiently 
accessible to the applicant.”10 
4 Ibid., para. 133.
5 Ibid., para. 135.
6 Ibid., para. 142. 
7 Ibid., para. 154.
8 Ibid., para. 161.
9 Ibid., para. 166.
10 Ibid., para. 168.
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Foreseeability and “In Part” Interpretation 
The crux of the case is whether it was foreseeable under international law in 1953 that the act for 
which the applicant was convicted could be qualified as genocide, and whether J.A. and A.A., 
with their prominent positions within the Lithuanian partisan movement, could fall under the 
protection of the national and ethnic groups. The ECtHR reiterated the possibility for wider and 
narrower interpretation in international and national law of the crime of genocide. The ultimate 
test in deciding what interpretation is applicable is the foreseeability element, as established by the 
Court in the Jorgić case, for “the scope of the concept of foreseeability depends to a considerable 
degree on the content of the instrument in issue, the field it is designed to cover and the number 
and status of those to whom it is addressed.”11 The ECtHR also cautioned that there is a particular 
obligation on persons in official capacity, such as Vasiliauskas, to proceed with a high degree of 
caution when pursuing their occupation. 
The ECtHR affirmed that it is legitimate and foreseeable for a successor State, such as Lithuania, 
to initiate criminal proceedings against individuals who have committed crimes under the former 
regime and “successor courts cannot be criticised for applying and interpreting the legal provisions 
in force at the material time during the former regime, but in the light of the principles governing 
a State subject to the rule of law and having regard to the core principles on which the Convention 
system is built.” 12 This is particularly exigent when the case concerns the right to life, “a supreme 
value in the Convention and international hierarchy of human rights and which right Contracting 
Parties have a primary Convention obligation to protect along with the obligation on the State to 
prosecute war crimes.”13 The Grand Chamber unsurprisingly reached the conclusion that domestic 
courts cannot convict the accused on retroactively applied broader interpretation of the crime of 
genocide passed later in time; although, domestic authorities are allowed to legislate broader scope 
of genocide in general.14 The same reasoning regarding retroactivity was also provided by the 
Lithuanian Constitutional Court, which in March 2014 ruled that the retroactive prosecution for 
genocide of a political or social group, when the crime was committed prior to the amendments of 
the Lithuanian Criminal Code in 1998, was unconstitutional.
Then the ECtHR examined the definition of the crime of genocide as it stood in 1953. Article 
II of the Genocide Convention covers four protected groups of persons: national, ethnical, racial 
or religious, and does not explicitly refer to social or political groups. The ECtHR looked at the 
drafting history of the Convention by citing the ICJ’s Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro 
case on the inclusion of the closed list of four specific groups. The ECtHR also invoked the Statutes 
of the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC to conclude that “genocide is defined as acts committed to 
destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, without reference to political groups.”15 
The crime of genocide was clearly recognized under international law in 1953 as evidenced by 
the 1946 UNGA Resolution 96(I), the 1948 Genocide Convention which was signed by the USSR 
on December 16, 1949 and came into force with the twentieth ratification on January 12, 1951, 
along with the ICJ’s 1951 Advisory Opinion which emphasized that “the principles underlying 
the Genocide Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on 
States, even without any conventional obligation.”16 The ECtHR found that “at the relevant time 
the applicant, even with the assistance of a lawyer, could have foreseen that the killing of the 
Lithuanian partisans could constitute the offence of genocide of Lithuanian nationals or of ethnic 
Lithuanians.”17 Nonetheless, the ECtHR deviated with the finding of the Lithuanian courts that 
the Lithuanian partisans constituted a significant part of the national or ethnic group in 1953, thus 
excluding J.A. and A.A. of the protection of Article II of the Genocide Convention. 
11 Ibid., para. 157.
12 Case of Kononov v. Latvia, European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber Judgment, May 17, 2010, App. No. 
36376/04, para. 241.
13 Ibid.
14 Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, GC Judgment, para. 181.
15 Ibid., para. 170.
16 Ibid., para. 80.
17 Ibid., para. 181.
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The main issue was whether the two killings of J.A. and A.A. could be considered to fall 
into the protected national and/or ethnic group along with belonging to a political group. The 
ECtHR focused on what is meant by the term “acts committed with intent to destroy,...in part, 
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such” in the elements of the crime of genocide 
under Article II of the Genocide Convention. The majority recalibrated its focus to finding whether 
before a conviction the demanding proof of specific intent, dolus specialis, is coupled with showing 
that the targeted group for destruction in its entirety or in substantial part was met. Based on 
the jurisprudence of the ICTY, ICTR, and ICJ, the ECtHR found that in 1953 it was foreseeable 
that the term “in part” contained a substantiality requirement, namely a numerical size of the 
targeted part of the group along with the prominence of the targeted individuals within the protected 
group. Nonetheless, the ECtHR reached the conclusion that the principles and interpretation in the 
cited jurisprudence as regards the prominence part could not have been foreseen by the applicant 
in the particular case to be included in the “in part” term in 1953.18 However, could the murders 
of the Lithuanian partisans as a significant part of the nation pass the threshold of the impact that 
their extermination would have on the survival of the national or ethnic group of Lithuanians as 
a whole?
There is no doubt that genocide could be discerned in the annihilation of a vast number of 
members of the protected group(s) coupled with the dolus specialis of the perpetrator. Moreover, 
the specific genocidal intent could consist of “the desired destruction of a more limited number 
of persons selected for the impact that their disappearance would have upon the survival of a 
group as such.”19 The intention to destroy the group “selectively” is based on the notion that 
the numeric size of the targeted part of the group should not be the end of the inquiry in order 
to determine the substantive requirement, but “in addition to the numeric size of the targeted 
portion, its prominence within the group can be a useful consideration.”20 The intention to destroy 
at least a substantial part of a particular group means “a reasonably substantial” rather than a 
purely numerically-based “reasonably significant” concept. In this manner, if the evidence of an 
intention to destroy a reasonably substantial number relative to the total population of the group 
is not met, then the specific intent of the perpetrator “may yet be established by evidence of an 
intention to destroy a significant section of the group, such as its leadership.”21 In other words, if 
the quantitative criterion is not met, the intention to destroy “in part” may be established by the 
qualitative criterion of the significance of the targeted section of the group, such as the leadership 
“who by reason of their special qualities of leadership within the group as a whole, are of such 
importance that their victimization…would impact upon the survival of the group, as such.”22 
Such interpretation for taking into account the prominence of the targeted persons within the 
group as a whole was also applied by the ICJ’s 2015 Croatia v. Serbia decision.23 Another example 
is the killing of three Bosnian Muslim leaders in Žepa which “was a case of deliberate destruction 
of a limited number of persons selected for the impact that their disappearance would have on the 
survival of the group as such,” thus emphasizing to all other members of the group their collective 
vulnerability and defenselessness.24  
The ECtHR accepted the argument of the applicant that the purpose of the MGB’s policies in 
Lithuania were aimed at the extermination of the partisans exclusively as “a separate and clearly 
identifiable group, characterized by its armed resistance to Soviet power.”25 In this manner the 
ECtHR rejected the finding of the domestic courts that the victims came within the definition 
of genocide as part of a protected group by analogy as such interpretation is to the applicant’s 
18 Ibid., para. 177.
19 Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Trial Chamber Judgment, December 14, 1999, IT-95-10, paras. 80 and 82.
20 Prosecutor v. Krstić, Appeals Chamber Judgment, April 19, 2004, IT-98-33-A, para. 12. 
21 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Judgment on the Defence Motion to Acquit, September 2, 2001, IT-95-8, paras. 65 and 76.
22 Ibid., para. 77.
23 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), International 
Court of Justice Judgment, February 3, 2015, para. 142.
24 See Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Trial Chamber Judgment, December 12, 2012, IT-05-88/02.
25 Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, GC Judgment, para. 182.
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detriment and the conviction would be rendered unforeseeable. Hence, the positions of J.A. and 
A.A. were rejected to be prominent enough to fall under the protection of Article II of the Genocide 
Convention.
Article 7 of the ECHR was interpreted differently in a joint dissenting opinion of Judges Villiger, 
Power-Forde, Pinto de Albuquerque and Kuris (Joint Dissenting Opinion). The four dissenting 
judges offered a detailed overview of the necessity to incorporate the assessment of the protected 
group(s) in light of the particular political, social and cultural context.26 The protected group is to 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis by taking into account the objective particulars of the social or 
historical context along with the subject perceptions of the perpetrator.27 The Lithuanian courts 
found that the sole existence of the partisans was the protection of the Lithuanian nation against 
the Soviet regime, which aimed at destroying its whole identity and, as such, the extermination 
policies of the Soviet authorities were targeting the nationality-ethnicity aspect.28 It should also 
be recalled that the purpose of the policies of the Soviet authorities centered “on the intent to 
destroy the fabric of a society through the elimination of its leadership, when accompanied by 
other heinous acts, such as mass deportations, could give a strong indication of genocide.”29 
The four dissenting judges noted that the partisans could not have survived for more than 
10 years as a national movement without the support of the Lithuanian people, and that J.A. and 
A.A. were targeted as ethnic Lithuanian partisans due to their prominence in society. The partisan 
movement consisted of members who were “simultaneously a significant and emblematic part 
of the national group and whose very purpose was the protection of the Lithuanian nation from 
destruction by the Soviet regime and that their killing was, therefore, an act of genocide.”30 The 
Lithuanian partisans may be considered a significant part of the national group because of their 
prominence and emblematic character as a targeted part of the specifically protected group, the 
four dissenting judges concluded.31 The partisans were targeted as a distinct, significant part of a 
group to be eliminated rather than as mere individuals within the group. Otherwise, why would 
the MGB/KGB documents not show any attempt to capture or bring the suspects to court?32 Judge 
Power-Forde concluded in her separate dissenting opinion that the approach of the majority in the 
case was “excessively formalistic and rather blinkered approach of viewing the partisans solely 
through the lens of a ‘political group’ and of ending its analysis there.”33  
The foreseeability of the existence of the crime of genocide could include circumstantial evidence 
to show the specific intent “such as the physical targeting of the group or of their property; the use 
of derogatory language towards members of the targeted group; the weapons employed and the 
extent of bodily injury; the methodological way of planning, the systematic manner of killing.”34 It 
is important to note that the factual analysis of the Lithuanian Courts was not arbitrary but based 
on the archival documents presented before the domestic instances and the acknowledgement 
of the Russian Federation in 1991 that the peoples including the Lithuanians were subjected to 
repression including genocide under the Soviet era.35 The Dissenting Opinion also invokes the 
number of the 20,000 Lithuanian partisans who were killed between 1944 and 1953. The MGB 
issued clear instruction in 1953 for extermination as evidenced by the minutes of the MGB from 
March 1953, urging that “bandits and nationalist underground should be eradicated” and that “[the 
MGB unit’s] goal was to exterminate as quickly and possible the bandits, those who help them and 
26 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Trial Chamber Judgment, December 6, 1999, ICTR-96-3, para. 56.
27 Prosecutor v Semanza, Trial Chamber Judgment, May 15, 2003, ICTR-97-20, para. 317.
28 Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, GC Judgment, para. 36.
29 Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, Joint Dissenting Opinion, para. 19.
30 Ibid., para. 16.
31 Ibid., para. 24.
32 Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, Judge Ziemele Separate Dissenting Opinion, para. 25.
33 Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, Judge Power-Forde Separate Dissenting Opinion.
34 Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Trial Chamber Judgment, January 22, 2004, ICTR-99-54A, para. 625.
35 Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, GC Judgment, para. 74, and Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, Joint Dissenting Opinion, para. 4.
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their contacts.” 36  It is sufficiently clear that the criminal plan was to exterminate any vestige of 
the identification with the national and ethnic belonging of the Lithuanians. The dissenting judges 
disagree with the finding of the majority that the applicant could not have known that he risked 
being charged with and eventually convicted of genocide in light of his high position in the MGB 
at the time of the operation.37 
Had Mr. Vasiliauskas sought legal advice as a high operational agent of the MGB whose task 
was the extermination of the most resistant part of the Lithuanian nation, “it is likely that he would 
have been advised that what he was doing bore the essential characteristics of the crime of genocide 
as it stood under international law at the time.”38 The atmosphere of complete impunity that the 
MGB agents enjoyed in their operations, evidenced by the lack of any prosecution even under the 
acting criminal code of the Russian SFSR for the deprivation of life in the particular case, does 
not in any way affect the applicability and binding force of international law and the prohibition 
of genocide on the territory of the USSR.39 Coupled with mass deportations, imprisonment and 
repressions against the partisans’ families, the cluster of acts against the protected group of the 
Lithuanian nation and ethnicity should be considered in its entirety in order to appropriately 
interpret the provisions in the Genocide Convention.40 Judge Ziemele in a Separate Dissenting 
Opinion provided elaborate analysis of the historical context of the struggle of the Lithuanian 
national partisans against the Soviet authorities by concluding that “the extermination of Lithuanian 
nationalism was necessary to achieve the subjugation of the Lithuanian people to the Soviet regime 
and its ideology.”41 
In regards to customary international law, the ECtHR accepted that the scope of the crime 
of genocide could be different from the conventional provisions, although opinions are divided 
on this subject matter. Special attention was paid to the language of the 1946 UNGA Resolution 
96(1) which called to protect “racial, religious, political groups and other groups” from genocide 
(emphasis added). The ECtHR provided three references to academic articles, which offer 
seemingly conflicting views on whether the customary prohibition of genocide included political 
or other groups in 1953. The Court sweepingly concluded that “there is no sufficiently strong basis 
for finding that customary international law as it stood in 1953 included ‘political groups’ among 
those falling within the definition of genocide” as “the scope of the codified definition of genocide 
remained narrower in the 1948 Convention and was retained in all subsequent international law 
instruments.”42 Such glossing over customary law is problematic as the ECtHR did not look in 
detail at the constitutive elements of customary law, namely state practice and opinio juris. The fact 
that the subsequent conventions codified a different scope of the protection does not necessarily 
mean that the customary law prohibition must have been identical in 1953. Custom and treaties 
are two separate sources of international law and the norms continue to co-exist and retain their 
separate existences, even if the relevant clauses are identical in content as stated in ICJ’s Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua case. The ECtHR should have looked into the state practice 
as in domestic judicial decisions during the relevant period from 1946 until 1953, as well as 
pronouncements of state officials. 
By just referring to a few law articles or books, one could not fully entertain the notion that 
the ECtHR has effectively served its function as a regional judicial body to find evidence whether 
customary law, in regards to the scope of the prohibition of genocide and the corresponding 
criminalization, were narrower or wider in 1953 in comparison to Article II of the Genocide 
Convention. For example, the ECtHR could have examined the Eichmann case of 1962, where the 
Supreme Court of Israel refers directly to UNGA Resolution 96(I) as evidence that the crime of 
36 Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, GC Judgment, para. 18.
37 Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, Joint Dissenting Opinion, paras. 29 and 30.
38 Ibid., para. 30.
39 Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, GC Judgment, paras. 71 and 72.
40 Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, Joint Dissenting Opinion, para. 26. 
41 Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, Ziemele Dissenting Opinion, para. 13.
42 Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, GC Judgment, para. 175.
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genocide was recognized during and after the Second World War. Although there are contemporary 
instances of domestic jurisdictions enlarging the scope of the protected group to include social 
and political groups, the ECtHR could have elaborated more on the issue as regards the early 
period of the prohibition of genocide in late 1940s and early 1950s.43 Hence, it is difficult to discern 
how the majority in the particular case reached an opinion different from the established principle 
that there is no retroactive application of the substantive law when the conviction in the domestic 
courts in part is based on the rules existing at the time of the commission of the act.44  
The ECtHR concluded with the non-applicability of Article 7(2) of the ECHR by examining if 
the applicant’s acts at the relevant time were criminal according to the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations. The ECtHR recalled the original, exceptional purpose of Article 
7(2) as being interlinked and interpreted in a concordant manner with Article 7(1) as laid down 
in the Tess v. Latvia case. The ECtHR rejected the argument that the rule of non-retroactivity does 
not apply if the act was criminal under Article 7(2) as Article 7(1) contains the general rule of the 
prohibition of retroactivity and Article 7(2) “is only a contextual clarification of the liability limb of 
that rule.”45 Hence, if the applicant’s conviction could not be justified under Article 7(1), it cannot 
be justified under Article 7(2) of the ECHR.
43 Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, GC Judgment, para. 58.
44 Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, Ziemele Dissenting Opinion, para. 20.
45 Case of Maktouf and Damjanović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber Judgment, 
July 18, 2013, App. Nos. 2312/08 and 34179/08, para. 72.
